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Abstract 
 
 This thesis aims to analyse the divergent forms of temporalities and spatilaities 
within the discourse of soft war. Temporality and spatiality are explored against the 
greater construct of historic and cultural identities. By doing so, this paper opens the 
space for questioning the relation between identity, discourse and time-space as 
structural elements of narrative. By using a deconstructionist framework, soft war 
discourse is analysed from a new post-positivist perspective that seeks to understand 
the instability and constructive nature of the soft war narrative. This paper concludes 
by suggesting that the different articulations of spatiality and temporality reveal soft 
war narrative as non-homogenous and disjunctive.  
Introduction 
 
 The disputed 2009 Iranian presidential elections and the subsequent mass 
protest movement against the regime resulted in the opening of a discursive space of 
contestation over the meaning, origins and objectives of the protesters. Each side 
attempted to produce and maintain meaning for constituents, antagonists and 
observers to legitimise their narrative1. Ayatollah Khamenei was quick to distinguish 
the illegitimacy of the protesters as fundamentally: ‘against the imam, the revolution 
and Islam.’2. The regime’s subsequent antagonistic discourse moved beyond the 
confines of a contemporary political interpretation, transforming into a larger 
narrative construct known as jang-e narm or “soft war”. The structure of soft war 
discourse is inherently contradictive as it attempts to make sense of the contemporary 
within a larger historical narrative of Western interference. This contradiction is most 
apparent in the temporal and spatial location of the “enemy”, existing both as a 
contemporary threat and a historical spectre, as malleable yet also fixed, as internal 
but also external. Above and beyond simply analysing the modalities of soft war, this 
study aims to investigate the spatial and temporal dimensions of soft war discourse as 
central to its narrative structure. The temporal and spatial dimension of soft war 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Michaelsen, M, Social Media in Iran: Politics and Society After 2009, ed. Faris, D, 
Rahimi, B, p.104  
2Sahimi, M, ‘Khamenei Lashes Out at Opposition’, PBS, (December 2009), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/12/khamenei-lashes-out-
at-the-opposition.html [Accessed 26/04/2016].	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discourse cannot be fully acknowledged without touching upon anti-imperialist, 
Islamist and nationalist identities, and in particular how these identities are mobilised 
within the discursive structure of soft war. This study aims to investigate the 
constructed narrative of soft war from a different perspective to previous research by 
using deconstructionist methodology and a discourse analysis method. When applied 
to the discourse of soft war, these frameworks are able to transcend both essentialist 
claims of Iranian identity as monolithic and immovable, and also illuminate the 
contingency of identity based on the contemporary and contextualised political 
constellations. By deconstructing the different temporal and spatial conceptions 
apparent in the discourse of the regime, this study concludes by arguing that a 
disjuncture exists in the overall structure of soft war discourse. 
 
Methodology 
 
Deconstruction 
 
 The focus on discursive narrative places deconstructionist theory as the central 
framework for analysis. Critically applying deconstruction is to ‘…question the 
privileged forms of representation whose dominance has led to the unproblematic 
acceptance of subjects, objects, acts, and themes.’3. Deconstruction theory is built 
upon the assumption that there exists no “objective” truth, but a construct of “truth” 
that forms through the challenge and reinforcement of norms through the medium of 
communication. Neumann explains the move from idea to “reality” in purely 
discursive terms, he argues that representations put forward ‘become a set of 
statements and practices through which certain language becomes institutionalized 
and ‘normalized’ over time.’4. Derridian deconstruction aims at ‘…radically 
unsettling what are taken to be stable concepts and conceptual oppositions.’5. The aim 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Der Derian, J, Shapiro, M, Internation/intertextual Relations: Postmodern Reading 
of World Politics, (Massachusetts, 1989) p. 13. 
4 Neumann, I, Qualitative methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide, ed. 
Klotz, A, Prakash, D, (New York, 2008). p. 61. 
5 Theories of International Relations, ed. Burchill, S, Linklater, A, Devetak, R, 
Donnelly, J, Paterson, M, Reus-Smit, C, True, J, (New York, 3rd ed. 2005) p. 168. 
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of this is to reveal the internal contradictions of a seemingly stable discursive 
structure. Deconstruction theory also exposes the hierarchy of binary concepts and the 
parasitical relationship of oppositions6. Binary concepts are not considered to be pure 
and monolithic, but instead deeply disjunctive and contradictory. Spatiality and 
temporality are central to the construction of narrative as they act as discursive aids in 
the constitution of knowledge, meaning and truth. This paper aims to deconstruct the 
specific spatial and temporal constructs within the discourse of soft war, and thus 
reveal the contradictive and disjunctive structures of each concept.  
 
Spatiality and Temporality 
 
 Kellerman notes that it is ‘difficult to point to a strictly formal definition of 
spatiality and temporality in the literature.’7. Spatiality and temporality analysed 
through a deconstructive framework are best defined through what they are not.  
Deconstructionism is a post-positivist theory and thus rejects the objective nature of 
temporality and spatiality. Lefebvre summarises the post-positivist view on space as, 
‘not a scientific object removed from ideology and politics; it has always been 
political and strategic.’8. Soja extrapolates this definition by stating that although 
‘space itself may be primordially given… the organization, use, and meaning of space 
is a product of social translation, transformation and experience.’9. Within a 
deconstructionist framework, the political and ideological organisation of space must 
be deconstructed through discourse analysis to reveal the subjective structure of 
spatial identities, threats and the greater soft war narrative. 
 Similarly to the non-objective post-positivist conception of spatiality, 
temporality is ‘the span of historically interpreted time, usually stretching from some 
original point in the past (a beginning, a founding movement) down to the period of 
ones lifetime.’10. This form of temporality moves beyond individualistic temporalities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid.  
7 Kellerman, A, ‘Time-Space Homology: A Societal Geographical Perspective’, Geo 
Journal Library, Vol. 11. (1989) pp. 20 -37. pp. 30 
8 Lefebvre, H, Reflections on the politics of space, Antipode, trans. Enders, M, vol. 8. 
No. 2.  (1976) pp. 30 – 36. pp. 32.  
9 Soja, E, ‘the Socio-Spatial Dialectic’, Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers, Vol. 70, No. 2 (1980), pp. 207 – 225. pp. 210. 
10 Kellerman, A, ‘Time-Space Homology: A Societal Geographical Perspective’, Geo 
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of biological lifespan towards a larger conceptualisation rooted in societal-collective 
experiences that are synonymous with memory11. Derrida’s temporal concept of 
hauntology builds on the societal-collective experience of the past. Hauntology 
intends to analyse the spectral shape of historical memory and the non-linear haunting 
of the past within the present. Hauntology presents a novel methodology for analysing 
the interpretation of historic memory and identity against contemporary political 
systems. Beyond a simple hauntological analysis, this study aims at investigating 
socially produced space and the historical interpretation of time manifest in the 
discourse of the Iranian regime from 2009 – 2013. 
Method 
 
Discourse analysis 
 
 Discourse analysis is the chosen method for analyzing the temporal and spatial 
structure of soft war because of its centrality to a deconstructionist methodology. As 
Jørgensen, Phillips and Marianne state, in discourse analysis theory and method are 
intertwined12. This positions discourse as the integral part of the deconstructionist 
methodology. Discourse is defined through what they have called ‘a particular way of 
talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world).’13. More 
broadly discourse can be defined as ‘a term to designate every kind of symbolic order 
of intentional process of communication and understanding’14. This wider definition 
of discourse derives from Derrida’s claim that ‘there is nothing outside the text.’15. 
This does not mean that analysis is limited to literature, but that the world is 
constituted like a text16. The aim of deconstruction theory is to read the multiple and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Journal Library, pp. 30. 
11 Ibid. 
12Jørgensen, M, Phillips, L, Marianne, W, Discourse Analysis As Theory and Method, 
(London, 2004) p. 4.  
13 Ibid. p. 1. 
14 Neubert, S, Kersten, R, ‘Towards A Constructivist Theory of Discourse: Rethinking 
the Boundaries of Discourse Philosophy’, University of Cologne, (2003), pp. 1 – 35 
pp. 3. 
15 Derrida, J, Of Grammatology, trans. Spivak, G, (Baltimorem 1997) p.159 
16Theories of International Relations, ed. Burchill, S, Linklater, A, Devetak, R, 
Donnelly, J, Paterson, M, Reus-Smit, C, True, J, p., p. 168.	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divergent intersubjective discourses that structure reality. Discourse analysis as a 
method is built upon the assumption that reality is an intersubjective construct and 
language is the enabler for actors to build and act upon such constructs17. Dabashi 
argues that discourse of a political order, regime, group or individual, ‘was not a 
given; it was not just there. It was concocted gradually and consistently.’ 18. The 
internsubjective nature of discourse from a post-positivist perspective defies viewing 
it as neutral. Discourse that claims to represent truth and “reality” is in fact mediated 
by what Shapiro has termed modes of representation and, the making of facticity 
through representations19. From a deconstructionist theoretical perspective, looking 
for what the discourse means becomes less important, how and why discourse occurs 
becomes the central questions to be answered. This paper seeks to investigate the 
temporal and spatial discourse of soft war primarily through the speeches, 
publications and symbolic actions of the Iranian regime. By doing so, this paper 
touches on the nexus formed between identity and soft war and its structural role 
within the discourse.    
Identity and soft war 
 
 Temporality and spatiality cannot be analysed in isolation to identity. This is 
because certain identities are called upon to form central discursive nodes in the 
narrative structure of soft war. Within soft war discourse identity references both the 
contemporary and historical, giving discourse legitimacy in a genealogical past while 
simultaneously addressing the contemporary political constellation.   
 Although contextualisation avoids an essentialist trap of viewing Iranian 
identity as timeless, monolithic and unmoving, there are however certain historic 
reference points of identity that various Iranian regimes have drawn upon during 
different times, resulting in various forms of temporal and spatial conceptions. 
Identity operates structurally like discursive scaffolding, holding the soft war 
narrative together through genealogical legitimisation that historicises the past as an 
objective truth and as evidence of the essentialist identities of the nation. Maloney’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Warnaar, M, Iranian Foreign Policy During Ahmadinejad: Ideology and Action, 
(New York, 2013) p. 6. 
18 Dabashi, H, Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundations of the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran, (New York, 1993) p. 5. 
19Der Derian, J, Shapiro, M, Internation/intertextual Relations: Postmodern Reading 
of World Politics, p. 14-15.  
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path dependency theory identifies the process of identity formation. Path 
dependencies are the development of contours that restrict the malleability of identity 
and discourse in order for identity to support and reproduce itself20. Maloney argues 
that change is restricted by the expectations and claims such discourse has set and 
made concrete through institutionalisation and discursive reproduction. Maloney 
recognises three primary forms of Iranian identity that act within path dependencies, 
“great power” nationalism, Islamism and anti-imperialism21. These three identities 
can be defined through what Laclau and Mouffe term nodal points in their discourse 
theory. Nodal points are the ‘privileged sign around which the other signs are ordered 
[and] the other signs acquire their meaning from their relationship to the nodal 
point.’22.  
  Discourse that references Nationalism, Islamism and anti-imperialism as 
political identities are not defined through binaries but embody ‘…different and often 
divergent identities, which are variously invoked as domestic political competition 
and international circumstance demand.’23. Although the malleability of identity is 
bound within certain path dependencies and utilized in relation to specific historical 
context, essentialism is avoided due to the fluctuation of identity primacy24. Historical 
context informs the primacy of certain identities during a given time, thus displacing 
the simplistic material/identity debate, and setting the parameters in which soft war 
discourse is produced and reproduced. Jørgensen and Phillips have stated that ‘the 
ways in which we understand and represent the world are historically and culturally 
specific and contingent’25. It is the historic and cultural specificity of Iranian identity 
bound in path dependencies, as well as contemporary contingency that define the 
utilization of identity in soft war discourse. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Ibid. p.91.  
21 Maloney, S, Shibley Telhami, Michael N. Barnett, Identity and Foreign Policy in 
the Middle East. (New York, 2002) p. 26- 27.	  
22 Jørgensen, M, Phillips, L, Marianne, W, Discourse Analysis As Theory and Method, 
p. 26.  
23 Maloney, S, Shibley Telhami, Michael N. Barnett, Identity and Foreign Policy in 
the Middle East , p. 91. 
24 Haghighat, S, ed. Ridgeon, Shi’I Islam and Identity: Religion, Politics and Change 
in the Muslim Community, (London, 2012) p.44 
25 Jørgensen, M, Phillips, L, Marianne, W, Discourse Analysis As Theory and Method, 
p. 5. 
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Literature Review  
Questioning the ideological/pragmatic divide  
 
 The discourse of soft war cannot be understood without touching upon the 
larger scholastic debate around the motives of Iran’s foreign policy. This remains 
crucial to understanding soft war discourse because it is embedded within a larger 
ideological construct in which the regime identifies, and legitimates power through. 
The debate surrounding the motives of Iran’s foreign policy has primarily consisted of 
two camps, those who believe that Iran’s foreign policy is driven by idealism and 
those who believe it to be driven by pragmatism.  
 The traditional locus of debate between Idealism and pragmatism is structured 
within the confines of imagining time as linear. This conceptualisations is based on 
the idea that ‘revolutionary governments in their early days tend to have a strong 
inclination toward ideological approaches to foreign policy.’26. And that ‘as these 
governments mature, pragmatic considerations inevitably become salient, since the 
state’s survival much depends on taking into account the realities of the outside 
world.’27. Aside from the elusive “realities of the outside world”, this line of 
argumentation is temporally flawed as it views temporal development as a one-
dimensional progression from ideology to pragmatism. This would result in the 
discourse of soft war as primarily “pragmatic” and rooted in non-ideological 
considerations. This temporal understanding of Iranian foreign policy moving from 
idealism to pragmatism fails to grasp the complex interaction between ideology and 
perceived pragmatism, and thus cannot explain discourse in any term except 
seemingly objective pragmatism. 
  On the other hand, exaggeration of the idealistic factors of Iranian foreign 
policy is equally inadequate in explaining soft war discourse. Scholars such as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Saghafi-Ameri, N, ‘Iranian Foreign Policy: Concurrence of Ideology and 
pragmatism’, Middle East Institute, (29 January 2009) 
http://www.mei.edu/content/iranian-foreign-policy-concurrence-ideology-and-
pragmatism [Accessed 03/20/2016]. 
27 Ibid. For another example see: Ramzani, R, ‘Ideology and Pragmatism in Iran’s 
Foreign Policy’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 58, No. 4 (2004), pp. 549-559.  
	   9	  
Salamey and Othman28 overemphasise the religious motives of Iran’s foreign policy 
and miss the complex nexus formed between perceived pragmatism and ideology. As 
Warnaar has noted, the axiom of separation between idealism and pragmatism is 
essentially a false point of division, as they ‘interrelate and complement each other, 
without ever leading to the kind of paradox or ambiguity anticipated by outside 
observers.’29. The discourse on soft war highlights the problematic nature of this 
divide as the division between pragmatism and ideology is increasingly blurred. 
Moreover, the pragmatic argument for defending Iran from “soft threats” is reinforced 
by a historic genealogy that is understood in ideological as well as material terms, 
feeding into temporal and spatial perceptions.  
 
Soft war literature 
 
 The discourse on Soft war has been well documented by scholars such as 
Price, Sreberny and Wastnidge. Price’s essay Iran and Soft War primarily seeks to 
investigate the line between soft power and soft war ‘and how the Iran experience 
…might contribute to the theory of strategic communications.’30. By seeking a 
taxonomic separation of soft war from soft power Price ultimately misses the relation 
soft war has with greater nationalist and religious discursive genealogies, let alone 
temporality and spatiality. By looking at soft war solely from a positivistic 
perspective, as an issue devoid of a socio-cultural past, Price falls into the trap of 
analysing soft war discourse in a void, separate from domestic influences. When 
Iranian identity is addressed, it is through the discourse of the regime without deeper 
analysis and not as a genealogical review of how the assemblage of Iranian identity 
influences the discourse of soft war. Price sets out the Islamic Republic’s argument 
for soft war through the discourse of the regime yet fails to question or analyse the 
structure of this discourse, presenting soft war as something fixed and empirical. 
 Sreberny’s article Too Soft on Soft War is a critique of Price’s essay that aims 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Salamey, I,. Othman, Z, ‘Shia Revival and Welayat al-Faqih in the making of 
Iranian Foreign Policy’, Politics, Religion and Ideology, (2011) Vol. 12. No. 2. pp – 
197 – 212. 
29 Warnaar, M, Iranian Foreign Policy During Ahmadinejad: Ideology and Action, 
p.30 
30 Price, M, ‘Iran and the Soft War’, International Journal of Communication, Vol.6, 
(2012) pp. 2397–2415, pp. 2397	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at tackling three issues; ‘the nature of soft war as a concept, the dearth of empirical 
context and history, and the piece’s [Iran and Soft War] confusingly unapologetic 
relativism.’31. Sreberny’s definition of soft war as:  
 
‘…the ideological emanation of the Islamic Republic, more specifically coming from 
the parastatal IRGC – the Revolutionary Guards…whose leadership have been key in 
the formulation of the concept and strategy of their “soft war”.’32. 
 
pushes beyond Price’s analytically narrow acceptance of the Islamic Republic’s 
definition of soft war. If Price fails to analytically question the discourse of soft war, 
Sreberny fails to move beyond a positivist paradigm that seeks to question if soft war 
is  “real” or “fictitious”: 
 
‘Many of the claims by the Islamic Republic about “soft war” are propaganda… If 
this language and these claims are not questioned … then we truly lose all ability to 
discriminate between valid argument and political bluster.’33.  
 
Sreberny believes that the central question to ask about soft war is its validity in 
reality, this overemphasis the dichotomy between a fixed “reality” and “false” 
propaganda. Deconstruction theory aims at not validating the “reality” of a concept 
but questioning the construction of discourse in defining what is considered “reality”. 
Or as Derrida makes clear in quoting Montaigne, ‘we need to interpret interpretations 
more than to interpret things.’34. 
 Mikimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle’s Strategic narrative: A new means to 
understand soft power outlines a discursive framework for analysing soft power and 
discourse. Although they do not touch upon soft war discourse directly, their 
framework of analysis raises some useful tools of discourse analysis. They claim that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Sreberny, A, ‘Too Soft on “Soft War”’, International Journal of Communication, 
Vol. 7. (2013) pp. 801 – 804, pp. 801.  
32 Ibid. pp. 802. 
33 Ibid. pp. 804. 
34 Derrida, J, Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences from 
his Writing and Difference, trans Bass, A,  (1978) p. 278. 
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‘strategic narrative is soft power in the 21st century.’35. By breaking discourse down 
into different components such as the actors involved, the conceptualisation of space, 
the conflict outlined and the suggested resolution36, strategic narrative opens a space 
to contemplate the internal structure of discourse. Mikimmon, O’Loughlin and 
Roselle claim that ‘war and conflict will be affected by the more extensive and 
intensive connectivity that is a feature of the new media ecology.’37. This change is 
also true for soft war discourse, as technology alters how the “enemy” is 
conceptualised. In Iran the 2009 presidential elections were the first elections to make 
use of new media mediums, this effectively created a new topology for activists, 
politicians and propagandists38. Strategic narrative is an important framework for 
analysing the different modes of discourse used by regimes in the 21st century because 
of its focus on the structural means regimes use to order the world and how new 
forms of technology affect their articulation of order.  
 Wastnidge’s essay The Modalities of Iranian Soft Power: From Cultural 
Diplomacy to Soft War uses Mikimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle’s concept of 
strategic narrative to explain both Khatami’s soft power, and Ahmadinejad’s soft war. 
Wastnidge builds upon a longer historical perspective contributing to the regime’s 
contemporary modalities of soft power. He places soft war in a larger genealogy by 
comparing it with Khatami’s idea of a “dialogue between civilizations”. Wastnidge’s 
research is limited to soft war’s ‘defensive face’39, and thus ignores the temporal and 
spatial discourse that constitutes the discursive structure of its discourse. With the 
exception of a comparison to Khatami’s “dialogue amongst civilizations”, focusing on 
‘top-down initiatives, whereby the state has control over the aspects of soft power that 
it wants to project and harness.’40. Here, Wastinidge falls into an explanatory analysis 
of the mechanics of soft war rather than explaining how soft war discourse has 
emerged and its constructed components.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Miskimon, A, O’Loughlin, B, Roselle, L, ‘Strategic narrative: A New Means to 
Understand Soft Power’, Media, War & Conflict, Vol.7. No.1. pp. 70 – 84. pp. 71. 
36 Ibid. p. 75-76.	  37	  Ibid.	  p.	  76.	  
38 Rahu, E, ‘Thirty Years Later: Iranian Visual Culture from the 1979 Revolution to 
the 2009 Presidential Protest’, International Journal of Communication, Vol. 7. 
(2013) pp. 1316 – 1343. pp. 1299. 
39Wastnidge, E, ‘The Modalities of Iranian Soft Power: From Cultural Diplomacy to 
Soft War’, Politics, Vol. 35. No (3-4). pp. 364 – 377. pp. 371. 
40 Ibid. pp. 364. 
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Temporalities of soft war 
 
‘It is indeed only in the disjunctive time of the nation's modernity - as a knowledge 
caught between political rationality and its impasse, between the shreds and patches 
of cultural signification and the certainties of a nationalist pedagogy - that questions 
of nation as narration come to be posed.’41 
 
 According to Bahbah the modern nation state is posited in a disjunctive 
temporality, a contradictive discourse that places the nation as simultaneously rooted 
in modernity and history. Bahbah argues that by exploring this temporal disjuncture, 
the structure of the nation as narration will be opened for analysis. Nationalist 
temporal discourse aims at ‘making the people ‘historical “objects” in a story of a pre-
founding social homogeneity.’42. On the other hand, the discourse of immediacy and 
modernity is grounded on what Bahbah has termed the process of signification43, a 
temporal structure that seeks to break with the past and ‘demonstrate the prodigious, 
living principles of the people as contemporaneity’44. The discourse of soft war and 
its structural imagination of temporality display Bahbah’s disjunctive time. The 
temporality of soft war is rooted in modernity and immediacy but also a historic 
nationalist and anti-imperialist identity. The temporal structures of soft war discourse 
also reveal the connection between the utilization of certain Iranian identities to 
political context and historical memory. This nexus between identity, historical 
memory and temporality raise the question of how certain historical phenomena are 
mobilised within the present? The exploration of these temporal structures within the 
discourse of soft war reveal not only the construction of narrative by the regime, but 
also the instability and disjuncture of the discourse of soft war.      
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Bahbah, H, The Location of Culture, (London, 1994) p.212 
42 Shapiro, M, ‘National Times and Other Times: Re-Thinking Citizenship’, Third 
Text, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 79-98. pp. 84. 
43Bahbah, H, The Location of Culture, p.215 
44 Ibid. 
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Soft war as immediacy 
 
 When defining the nature of soft war, scholars have tended to focus on it as a 
strategic operation45 within a larger framework of foreign policy objectives. By 
focusing primarily on the operational aspect of soft war, scholars have overlooked the 
temporality of operational discourse that is articulated through the discourse of 
immediacy. Moreover, this misses a larger insight into what Bahbah has termed the 
‘essential question of the representation of the nation as a temporal process.’46. The 
discourse of immediacy represents a strand of temporal imagination that presents soft 
war as an immediate threat and as a break with past threats. The immediate is defined 
as ‘a relation or action without an intervening medium or agency.’47, thus rendering it 
direct and undiluted. Soft war discourse of immediacy dissolves the spatial distance of 
the “enemy” – from there to here – and the temporal distance of the threat – from not 
now to now.  
 The temporal threat of immediacy was first articulated by Ayatollah 
Khamenei in his inauguration of soft war discourse48. The immediacy of the threat 
emphasized by Khamenei was a direct response to the 2009 Green Movement protests 
that shook the foundations of the regime49. Soft war became a top priority of the 
regime, with the Supreme Leader stating that: ‘Today, the country’s top priority is to 
fight against the enemy’s soft war.’50. Khamenei’s definition of soft war as a new “top 
priority” of immediacy was complemented by soft war being explained in 
genealogical terms, as something rooted in history. This dual function of temporality 
and subsequent temporal disjuncture, positioned the discourse within Iranian anti-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Price, M, ‘Iran and the Soft War’, International Journal of Communication, pp. 
2398. 
46 Bahbah, H, The Location of Culture p.212 
47 Oxford English Dictionary, ‘Immediate’.	  	  ed.	  Stevenson,	  A,	  (3rd	  edition,	  Oxford	  2010),	  p.874. 
48 The earliest instance of soft war being publically mentioned was 2007. Safshekan, 
R, Sabet, F, Soft War: A New Episode in the Old Conflict Between Iran and the USA, 
p.15. 
49 Monshipouri, M, Information Politics, Protests, and Human Rights in the Digital 
Age, (Cambridge, 2016) p. 79. 
50 Quoted from Akhaven, N, Electronic Iran: The Cultural Politics of an Online 
Evolution, (London, 2013) p. 97. Emrooz Olaviyat-e Keshvar Moghabel-e ba Jang-e 
Narm-e Ast "[Today, the country's top priority is to fight against the enemy's soft 
war}, Fars News, (Nov 2009) www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8809041385.24. 
[Accessed 1/06/16]. 
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imperialist identity and a larger narrative of collective Iranian history. In outlining the 
nature of soft war in 2009 Khamenei structured his discourse in disjunctive temporal 
space: 
 
“Everyone today understands and knows that the confrontation between the 
Arrogance [United States] with the Islamic Republic is no longer like the 
confrontation of the first decade of the revolution. In that confrontation they exercised 
their power, and were defeated. That was a hard confrontation...However this is not 
the priority of the Arrogance for confronting the Islamic regime. The priority today is 
what is called soft war; that is war using cultural tools, through infiltration [of our 
society], through lies, through spreading rumours. Through the advanced instruments 
that exist today, communication tools that did not exist 10, 15, and 30 years ago, have 
become widespread. Soft war means creating doubt in people’s hearts and minds”51 
 
Here, soft war is rooted in the historical conflict between the arrogant powers (West) 
and Iran. It is also presented as a new type of conflict, “no longer like the 
confrontations of the first decade” and waged through “advanced instruments that 
exist today”. Iranian officials reinforced this soft war discourse building upon the 
novelty of this type of warfare, proclaiming it as something harder to counter than a 
traditional war waged by the enemy: ‘…far more difficult than a hard war, and we 
must... produce soft power in the country,’ 52. The soft war is characterised as a new 
type of threat that needs to be confronted in a creative way.53. But also as a confusing 
postmodern war that continues informally even in peaceful situations54. 
 Immediacy is also emphasised through the utilization of new technologies by 
the enemy. In January 2010 in the midst of growing protests in Iran, the Islamic 
Development Organization published an official definition of soft war.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 “Bayanat Dar Jam-e Kasiri Az Basijiyan Keshvar. (A speech to a large crow of the 
nation’s Basij)” The Center for Preserving and Publishing the Works of Grand 
Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei. (2009). from Safshekan, R, Sabet, F, Soft War: A 
New Episode in the Old Conflict Between Iran and the US. 
52 ‘“Enemies trying to create Social Crisis in Iran” Intelligence Minister”’, Payvand 
Iran News, (July 2012) http://www.payvand.com/news/12/jul/1135.html [Accessed 
2/06/16]. 
53Akhaven, N, Electronic Iran: The Cultural Politics of an Online Evolution, p. 103.  
54Islamic Development Organization, Critique and Analysis: Soft War Reason Against 
Islamic Republic of Iran, (2010) http://old.ido.ir//en/en-a.aspx?a=1388101204  
[Accessed 4/06/2016]. 
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‘Soft war versus hard war means any kind of psychological warfare action and media 
propaganda which targets society and induces the opposite side to accept failure 
without making any military conflict.’55. 
 
The specific means of soft war outlined by the IDO are ‘subversion, internet war, 
creation of radio-television networks and spreading the rumors [sic]’56 with the 
objective of weakening the ‘thought of the given society and also causes the socio-
political order to be annihilated via the media propaganda’57. The role of the media is 
central to defining soft war and subsequently the temporality of immediacy. The 
discourse of soft war as immediacy defines the media as an instantaneous weapon 
using various digitalised platforms. Iranian Intelligence Minister Heydar Moslehi 
claimed in 2012 that: ‘Western intelligence agencies…participated in the sedition of 
2009’58, and that the ‘Media is the most important tool for the enemy in this war…’59. 
The emphasis on new technologies marks a temporal break with wars of the past; no 
longer are traditional methods capable of combating the enemy: ‘All capacities and 
the latest technologies must be used in getting [our] message across in this arena [of 
soft war]’60. Thus, integral to soft war is its temporal immediacy that is communicated 
through the medium of new technologies. It is through the utilization of new 
technologies that the enemy had supposedly orchestrated the “sedition” of 2009, in 
response the regime attempted to inform the population about the nature of the enemy 
and the immediate threats they faced. 
 Khamenei’s inauguration of the immediate threat of soft war saw a response 
of official blogs and Web sites dedicated to unmasking the enemy and educating the 
Iranian people on the threats of soft war61. Numerous television programs, books and 
newspaper articles confirmed the soft threat and built upon the soft war discourse set 
by the regime. The aim of these broadcasts was to inform the public about the war and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Ibid.	  56	  Ibid.	  57	  Ibid.	  58	  ‘“Enemies trying to create Social Crisis in Iran” Intelligence Minister”’, Payvand 
Iran News, (July 2012) http://www.payvand.com/news/12/jul/1135.html 	  59	  Ibid.	  60	  Ibid.	  	  61	  Akhaven, N, Electronic Iran: The Cultural Politics of an Online Evolution, p. 97.	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encourage individual actors to produce competitive media content.62. This 
dissemination of soft war discourse into a broader public space led to the 
popularisation of the concept and its further discursive solidification when 
institutionalised. 
 
Soft war as institutionalised 
 
 Price states that the term “soft war” remains somewhat nebulous, as ‘no 
elaborated discourse of acceptable methods and articulated limits’ has been 
solidified.63. This might have been true before the institutionalisation of soft war, but 
with its inauguration into a strategic and political framework, the discourse of soft 
war became somewhat bound to the discursive contours of the regime. In her path 
dependency theory on the formation of identities, Maloney outlines the malleability of 
identity and its restriction to the limits of discourse. She argues that discourse 
becomes realised in concrete material terms through its institutionalisation64. The 
initial steps of material institutionalisation of Soft war discourse took place in May 
2009 when the Iranian Majlis designated $100 million for “soft” programs65. 
Furthermore, the creation of a “Unit of the Soft War” was announced, it would be 
responsible for ‘soft operations such as propagation, cultural activities and 
psychological operations.’ 66. The move towards institutionalisation of soft war 
discourse was further enhanced in November 2011when Mohammad Jafar 
Mohammad Zadeh, the deputy minister of culture and Islamic guidance proclaimed: 
‘that providing support for works about the soft war was one of the ministry’s top 
priorities.’67. The institutionalisation of soft war discourse into a material “Unit of 
Soft War” solidified the discourse as a material entity rather then a discursive 
conception. The creation of a Unit of Soft War was completed in December 2011 and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Ibid.	  p.	  99.	  63	  Price, M, ‘Iran and the Soft War’, International Journal of Communication, pp. 
2399.	  	  
64 Maloney, s, ‘Identity and Change in Iran’s foreign Policy’, Identity and Foreign 
Policy in the Middle East, p.91. 
65 Adelkhan, N, ‘Iran Integrates the Concept of the “Soft War” into its Strategic 
Planning,’ Terrorism Monitor, Vol, VIII. No. 23 (2010) pp. 1 – 9. pp. 7 – 8.  
66 Ibid. Brigadier General Said Masoud. (Press TV, August 16, 2009; IRNA, January 
2). pp. 7. 
67 Akhaven, N, Electronic Iran: The Cultural Politics of an Online Evolution, p. 99. 
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inaugurated by Brigadier General Massoud Jazayeri who announced that: 
 
‘We should accelerate our activities in the era of soft war and make necessary 
changes and reforms…[Because]…Enemies are now doing their best to create 
obstacles on the way of Iran’s success and progress in Cyber war.’68.  
 
Jazayeri’s temporal observation of a new “era” is similar to Khamenei’s discourse of 
immediacy, constituting something outside the past trajectory of time to an 
“accelerated” era of immediacy. Iran’s historic “enemies”, the West, complement 
Jazayeri’s era of immediacy. IRGC cultural official General Mohammad Ali Masud, 
exemplified the discursive pinnacle of the institutionalisation of soft war discourse by 
boasting that ‘At present, more than 17,000 active (IRGC) members in various 
cultural spheres are ready to serve the Islamic society and counter the enemies’ soft 
war, 69. This showed the integrated strength soft war had within a larger defence 
policy and the potential in mobilizing against the enemy. 
 
Soft war as hauntology 
 
 The institutionalisation of soft war not only solidified the contours of 
discourse within an official political framework, but also highlighted the connection 
between the utilisation Iranian anti-imperialist identity to the contemporary political 
context of the 2009 protests. This placed the regime’s discourse of the protests within 
a larger conceptualisation of Iranian history. In order to analyse the utilisation of anti-
imperialism within the discourse of soft war, a non-linear historicist framework for 
investigation is required. Analysing the temporal nature of Iranian anti-imperialist 
discourse reveals the evocation of the past within the present. The perception of the 
past and collective historical memory ingrained in anti-imperialist discourse haunts 
the present, blurring the linear distinction between past, present and future. Ware has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 ‘Jazayeri: Soft War Headquarters Established by Iranian Armed Forces’, Islamic 
Republic News Agency, (January 2012) 
http://www.irna.ir/en/News/80437009/Politic/Jazayeri__Soft_war_headquarters_estab
lished_by__Iranian_Armed_Forces [Accessed 2/06/16]. 
69 ‘Official: IRGC Ready to Counter Enemy Soft War’, Tasnim News Agency, 
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argued that ‘the problem with historicism is that it views time scientifically, that is, as 
an objective continuum that is “filled up” with events.’70. It is for this reason that a 
non-linear approach is best suited to understand how historic memory haunts the 
discourse of the present. In an Iranian context, anti-imperialist discourse forms ‘a 
crucial set of values embedded in many constructions of Iranian national identity.’71. 
Anti-imperialism draws primarily upon the notion of the need to preserve 
independence from external forces72. Historical perception and experience are 
subsidiary to the potential threat of interference and in Iran’s domestic affairs.  
 The temporal structure of anti-imperialist soft war discourse invokes Derrida’s 
deconstructionist hauntological framework. Hauntology is an important theoretical 
tool of temporal analysis because it defies linear temporalities. Its focus is to analyse 
the haunting of the past in the discourse of the present, and the temporal non-linear 
relationship between past, present and future.73. ‘The time is out of joint’74 in the 
hauntological framework because ‘there is never a beginning-or an end-of time.’75. 
Moreover, Derrida’s defines hauntological space-time as  
 
‘The place inhabited by the revenant, the spirit, and spectres…that keep returning; [it 
is also]…obsession, [and] fear.’76.  
 
Applied to anti-imperialist discourse of soft war, hauntology reveals the temporal 
interaction between historical memory and contemporary political constellations. 
Within this framework, the spectre of Western imperialism haunts the discourse of 
soft war as a spectre that is neither dead nor living but phantom-like.  
 Anti-imperialist discourse complements the binary opposition of perceived 
neo-colonist conduct by the West and historical reference to past imperialism. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Ware, O, ‘Dialectic of the Past / Disjuncture of the Future’, Journal for Cultural 
and Religious Theory, Vol. 5. No. 2. pp. 99 – 114. pp. 102. 
71 Holiday, S, Defining Iran: Politics of Resistance, (New York, 2011) p. 159. 
72 Ibid. p. 159. 
73 Derrida, J, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and 
the New International, trans. Kamuf, P, (New York, 1994). p. 45. 
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76 Derrida, J, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and 
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discourse of neo-colonialism cannot stand alone as it is informed by the spectre of 
historical memory, particularly the division of Iran into British and Russian spheres of 
influence in 1907, and the overthrow of Mossadegh by a CIA led initiative in 1953. 
 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s infamous 2011 UN speech invoked the spectre of 
anti-imperialism within soft war discourse by accusing Western powers of: ‘Using 
their imperialistic media network which is under the influence of colonialism,’77. 
Here, Ahmadinejad presents soft war as a new type of war based on new 
technologies, but also rooted in historic anti-imperialist discourse, defining the West 
as militaristic and hegemonic. Building upon the discourse of Ahmadinejad, Culture 
and Islamic Guidance Minister Sayed Mohammed Hosseini stated in 2012 that: ‘the 
hegemonic powers and the imperialists use media as a propaganda machine to control 
the mass opinion and show a negative picture of Islam and Iran to their audiences.’ 78. 
The perpetrators of soft war are identified specifically as the “imperialists” and their 
weapon is the “media as a propaganda machine” that aims to undermine the 
fundamental Islamic identity of the Iranian nation.  
 The evocation of Iran’s historic memory of imperialism and subsequent anti-
imperialist discourse has been articulated from the highest echelons of the regime. 
Khamenei emphasised the historic domination of the West on the Muslim world: 
‘Colonialism dominated and ruled Islamic territories for two hundred years and today 
it is the arrogant powers that have dominated certain parts of the Islamic world.’79. 
Khamenei links the temporalities of historic memory (past) to the immediacy of threat 
(present) through the evocation of anti-imperialist discourse. Moreover, Khamenei 
believes that:  ‘The world is still suffering from colonialism, which is now applying 
modern methods.’80. Although the colonial Empires of the West have collapsed, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77McGreal, C, ‘Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's UN speech prompts diplomatic walkouts’, 
The Guardian, (September 2011) 
 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/22/mahmoud-ahmadinejad-united-
nations-speech [Accessed 08/06/16] 
78 ‘Media in forefront of Soft War Against Enemy: Culture Min’, Islamic Republic 
News Agency, (May 
2012)http://www.irna.ir/en/News/368555/%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84%D8%AA/M
edia_in_forefront_of_soft_war_against_enemy__Culture_Min [Accessed 08/06/16]. 
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evocation of “colonialism” and “modern methods” suggest a new type of colonial 
domination that references the memory of the past but also signals a break into 
contemporary modernity. 
 
The hauntological enemy 
 
  Soft war discourse relies on a hauntological evocation of the phantom of 
Western imperialism into the temporal contemporary. The “enemy” within the 
discourse of soft war is posited in the temporal duality of historic memory of Western 
imperialism and in the immediacy of the digital age. The regime’s definition of the 
2009 protest movements as “sedition” orchestrated by Western imperialist powers 
highlighted the temporal duality and discursive instability of anti-imperialist discourse 
within the soft war narrative. In December 2013, recalling the events of 2009 and the 
danger of future interference, Assembly of Experts member Hojjat al-Eslam Ahmad 
Khatami warned students that: ‘the seditionists are trying to use you.’81. This mode of 
discourse of Western hegemony orchestrating “sedition” within Iran builds upon anti-
imperialist discourse. Ahmad Khatami went on to say that:  
 
“After the [2009] Sedition, the Supreme Leader used the word ‘sedition’ more than 
200 times in his speeches. People who say something else and do not say ‘sedition’ are 
taking actions in opposition to the line of the Supreme Leader.” 
 
Ahmad Khatami’s statement explicitly outlines how the enemy should be defined 
based on the discourse of the Supreme Leader. Any deviation from this discourse is 
positioned as antagonistic towards the Supreme Leader and subsequently aligned with 
the discourse of the enemy.  
  The “enemy” is an elusive concept that has been defined through different 
modes of discourse. The term “Cultural NATO” has been used by the regime to 
describe the perpetrators of a new kind of war waged by the West, this term precedes 
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the conceptualisation of soft war82 and has subsequently been used synonymously to 
describe the perpetrators of soft war. The Islamic Development Organization has 
described the function of “cultural NATO” as aiming: ‘to capture and target nation’s 
beliefs and trust for the purpose of exploiting them.’83. “Cultural NATO” describes 
the modalities used by the “enemy” in their perpetration of soft war. Price has 
described this term as implying ‘both a quasi-military approach from the West and a 
coordinated activity among an alliance of external states.’84. Furthermore, it suggests 
a weaponisation of cultural space. The enemy’s objectives are described in temporal 
terms as ‘…long-term, convenient and inexpensive’85; as opposed to traditional 
military intervention that is ‘short-term, troublesome and more expensive’86. This 
contrast between soft war’s long-term and hard war’s short-term temporality is in 
contrast to the temporal immediacy of soft war. This inconsistency within discourse 
demonstrates the instability of the soft war narrative, its non-homogeneity, presenting 
the temporality of soft war as immediate yet also long-term. 
 
Spatialities of Soft war 
 
‘The symbolic maintenance of the nation-state requires a management of historical 
narratives as well as territorial space… on what is actually a series of fragmentary and 
arbitrary conditions of historical assemblage.’87. 
 
 The management of territorial space within the discourse of soft war is defined 
through the imagined spaces occupied by the enemy and Iran. Soft war’s discursive 
temporal structure exists as a disjuncture between new and old threats, through the 
immediacy of technology and as a haunting of history. The spatiality of soft war 
discourse is equally disjunctive in structure, existing as both a traditional spatial 	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conflict between Iran and the West, as outside versus in, but also as something 
exceptional, as a new type of spatial topography that dissolves national boundaries 
and traditional areas of battle. This chapter looks at the specific characteristics of 
these disjunctive specialities analysing the different structural facets.  
 
Spatiality of the enemy 
 
 Similarly to the political context that moulded the temporal structure of soft 
war discourse, the conceptual spatiality of the enemy grew out of the 2009 protest 
movement. New technologies played a crucial role in the regimes conception of the 
enemy because of the widespread use of social media platforms by the protesters to 
organise “sedition”. The expansion of social media as a tool for organisation and 
communication led to the exchange of ideas and information that reached outside 
national boundaries88. Akhaven has identified the important role members of the 
diaspora and international media played in magnifying the events of the 2009 
protest89. He argues that new communication technologies and social media platforms 
blurred the division between external and internal participants of dissent and led to 
‘the state identify[ing] the enemy as both internal and external realizing that 
participants on both sides of the country’s borders were talking to each other.’90. The 
use of new technologies and the subsequent new spatial interpretation did not mean 
that the traditional spatial discourse of binaries was dropped. Dalby summarises this 
traditional binary notion of spatiality as existing as a discourse that ‘…constructs 
worlds in terms of Self and Others, in terms of cartographically specifiable sections of 
political space, and in terms of military threats.’91. The spatial discourse of soft war 
instantaneously went beyond the traditional conceptualization of space outlined by 
Dalby, as a binary self and other, while at the same time referencing the historic 
binary threat of the outside (West) versus the internal (Iran). This presented a second 
disjunctive discursive structure alongside the temporal.  
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Traditional external threat 
 
 Like its temporal counterpart, the spatial characterisation of the external threat 
in soft war discourse places the enemy in a larger construction of anti-imperialist 
discourse, but also draws upon Islamist and nationalist identities. Spatial 
conceptualisation of soft war is built upon the idea that Iran is at the centre of a new 
type of war waged by international imperialism92. This spatial conception positions 
Western imperial powers as an external threat to the internal stability and prosperity 
of Iran. The genealogy of this discourse can be traced back to the 1950s and the 
publication of Gharbzadegi (Plagued by the West) by Jalal Al-e Ahmad. Gharbzadegi 
introduced the concept of the West as an external disease infecting Iranian society 
through cultural domination, as: ‘…a sickness, a disease imported from abroad, and 
developed in an environment receptive to It.’93. Since 1979, Al-e Ahmad has 
subsequently become a crucial part of the ‘cannon of revolutionary literature’94. 
Ayatollah Khamenei has praised Al-e Ahmad as: ‘the man who…stood at the summit 
of the literature of resistance’95. Al-e Ahmad’s belletrist discourse of the West 
occupying the cultural spaces of Iran has been integrated into the official definition of 
soft war published by the Islamic Development Organization: 
 
 ‘The plan of "Cultural NATO"…consists of the offensive line…to enter into the 
cultural, artistic and media arenas so that they deal…a black picture against Iran.’96 
 
The IDO designates the role of Cultural NATO as not only infiltrating different 
cultural spaces of Iran but also attempting to dominate the nations desires: 
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‘One of the purposes of cultural NATO is to put the national-religious culture of 
societies on the margin so that it holds in hand the control of the world's affairs via 
the domination of its desires.’97. 
 
 The enemy is spatially external yet involved in masterminding and 
orchestrating plots internally. The imperialist West is presented as both a puppet 
master controlling internal malpractices and an opportunist scavenger praying on 
turmoil. The involvement of the external West in the internal affairs of Iran was 
outlined again in Khamenei’s speech in June 2009 when explaining the cause of the 
protest movement:  
 
“…foreign elements triggered a line of destruction, arson, pillage of public wealth and 
unrest; they have no link to people or supporters of candidates rather they are related 
to ill wishers of the Iranian nation and mercenaries of western and Zionist spy 
services.”98  
 
The West not only triggered the “wave of destruction” of 2009 but opportunely:  
 
 
"… tried to ride the wave of protests following the elections and gradually pushed 
aside covers from their true face. Some of them showed their enmity with the Islamic 
System and the British Government proved more wicked than others in this regard,"99. 
 
Contrastingly to the broad categorisation of the “imperialist West”, the “British 
Government” is specifically picked out as a point of reference and as a power behind 
the 2009 “sedition”. This identifies the enemy within a historical narrative of anti-
imperialist discourse against British interference and as spatially external but 
attempting to meddle in the internal functions of Iran.  
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The hand and the puppet master 
 
 The discourse does not only identify the spatial nature of the enemy as an 
external threat but creates a counter narrative of action to: “cut off the arrogant 
powers’ hands.”100. According to Khamenei, it is such actions of resistance that: “…is 
the main reason why the arrogant powers are angry with the nation and hatch plots 
against it”101 and thus: “last year’s sedition was a manifestation of the enemies’ 
plots.”102. The image of the “hand” evokes imperial orchestration of the 2009 
movement in contrast to organic democratic struggle. The “hand” is symbolic of a 
foreign body, an organ of manipulation, alien to Iran. This imagery legitimises the 
symbolic “cutting” of the hand, as a means for Iran to loose itself from the external 
grip of manipulation. The “hand” was conjured once again in Khamenei’s attempt to 
regain the support of the leaders of the Green Movement, many of whom supported 
the 1979 revolution and the subsequent Islamic government: 
 
"I recommend all my old friends and brothers to overcome their sentiments and view 
the hidden hands of enemies and hungry wolves which gradually shed their mask of 
diplomacy," 103 
 
The “hidden hand” absolves the opposition leaders of full responsibility for their 
actions, as they are merely the “hands” unknowing puppets and not the masterminds 
of the “sedition”. The protest movements of 2009 are thus placed as originating in the 
spatial confines of “outside”, in the enemy’s space and subsequently imported into 
Iran. Shapiro notes that the modern nation state attempts to construct ‘a coherent 
culture, united on the basis of shared decent or, at least, incorporating a ‘people’ with 
a historically stable coherence.’104. The traditional concept of spatiality in the 
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discourse of soft war attempts to do this through creating a taxonomy of discursive 
binaries of West/Iran. The creation of binaries touches on Campbell’s argument that 
‘the social space of inside/outside is both made possible by and helps constitute a 
moral space of superior/inferior’105. The construction of a nation embodying a 
coherent and united morally superior culture is evident in Brigadier General Bahman 
Kargar definition of the plotters as: 
 
 "… global arrogance (forces of imperialism) [which] tries to hurt our country and 
change our Islamic-Iranian taste in order to leave destructive impact on our youth and 
drive our Islamic culture toward the Western culture."106 
 
Kargar describes the nation as ontopoligic, as a political community aligned perfectly 
with its identity and territory, as a homogenous state with one “Islamic-Iranian taste”. 
Here Islamic culture is presented as binary to Western culture, both are pitted as 
monolithic and unchanging homogenous identities that are mutually exclusive and 
non-reconcilable. 
 
Mosques as trenches 
 
 The symbolic evocation of a mosque as a source of defence against the 
imperialist’s soft war evokes another strand of Iranian identity, Islamism. Mosques 
have received particular attention in soft war discourse as a line of defence and as an 
ideological space for combatting the psychological war conducted by the West. The 
evocation of nationalist and Islamist identity draws upon the idea that the ontopoligic 
foundations of the nation are under attack from external forces. This attack moves 
from micro to the macro as it first focuses on the:  
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‘destruction of family relations and spreading disappointment among women through 
unveiling, storm of websites, means of communication and T.V channels are… tricks 
of enemy by which they are targeting Iranian women.’107. 
 
The traditional familial relations are considered a central aspect of Iranian identity 
and thus a target of soft war. If the family unit is considered the bedrock of Iranian 
identity, then mosques are the symbolic spatial fortresses: ‘To give attention to 
mosques is the best way to compete [against the] cultural attack by the enemy….the 
scholars should urge the youngsters…to the mosques…’108. The mosques are an 
important spatial location for defending against soft war because they are the centre of 
religious teachings, the basis of Iran’s theocratic system. Mosques are: ‘strong 
trenches to defeat soft war. It is the enemy’s objective to keep the youngsters away 
from mosques.’109. The mosque functions as “a strong trench” but also an offensive 
space for education, against the soft war of the enemy:  
 
‘Mosques are the most significant bases against the enemy in the soft war and 
education and training of religious and revolutionary youth is on top of the list of the 
agenda.’110. 
 
The spatial conception of the Mosque as a trench relies on placing the youth as 
ideological foot soldiers with religion as their weapon. The mosque is also conceived 
as a training ground where: ‘youngsters should face the soft war by the enemy while 
getting knowledge and wisdom from mosque centers.’111. Commander of IRGC's 
Sahib ul-Amr Corps Salar Abnoush made a similar claim when outlining the 
defensive qualities of Islam in Iran: ‘Our soft war power is much more than [the] 
enemy's since Islam and our beliefs are our backbone, and this backbone is the 	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strongest in the world."112. This exceptionalism places Islam as a source of resistance 
and mosques as central nodes of defence. The mosque as a defensive space also 
interlinks with a timeless and unchanging temporality of political Islamic discourse 
that constitutes resilience of Iran against outside forces: ‘Mosque centers have always 
played an important role against the cultural attack of enemy.’113. Mosques fall into a 
greater propagation of religious values and as a means of attracting the youth: 
‘towards religious affairs [this is] the most momentous way to deal with cultural 
argument of the enemy.’114. The mosque is seen as a space in which the regime’s core 
political Islamic identity can be disseminated as a mechanism of ideological defence 
against the enemy.  
 
New and Exceptional threat 
 
 Beyond the traditional binary threat posed in the spatial discourse of soft war, 
spatial occupation of Iran is also imagined as a new and exceptional threat. This new 
and exceptional threat imagines space in ideological terms, or what Appadurai has 
termed the ideoscape115. This discursive form dissolves the spatial boundaries 
between external and internal, and between Iran and the enemy. The location of the 
enemy is both internal and external and their objective is not only to alter the physical 
configuration of the state but also the internal ideoscape of the Iranian people. This 
space has been called the ideoscape as a means of spatialising ideology. In contrast to 
the discourse of external threats, the new and exceptional threat is defined as a 
historic break with external threats of past.  
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 Soft war has been topographically defined as: not remaining ‘limited to 
borders.’116. This conclusion has been reached because of its ideological and 
psychological dimension. Brigadier General Bahman Kargar highlights this new and 
exceptional threat by positioning the soft war as a break from the traditional methods 
of attack: ‘In the soft war enemies are trying to penetrate into the minds of our people 
and change their beliefs.’ 117. The enemy is able to enter past the physical national 
defences of the nation into the very headspace of the Iranian people through the 
utilisation of new forms of digital technology and mass communication networks. The 
possibility for the enemy to penetrate the minds and beliefs of Iran on a digital 
topography blurs the spatial distinction between internal and external enemy. 
Khamenei has summarised this new spatiality of the enemy: 
 
‘Today if one takes a look at the enemy's efforts in the vast arena of methods of 
propaganda - from Internet tools to audio visual means and to mouthpieces they have 
in different places inside and outside the country.’118. 
 
Here, Khamenei imagines the spatial location of the enemy as both inside and outside 
the nation, beyond the simple binary of external/internal. Furthermore, new 
technologies such as the Internet and audiovisual technology are specifically 
referenced in the context of this new spatial landscape. New communication 
technologies have led to the cyber environments becoming: ‘one of the most 
important means of soft warfare.’119. The emphasis on new technologies is rooted in 
the temporality of immediacy through placing the war as happening “today”, but the 
rise of new technologies has also altered the strategic landscape for fighting against 
the enemy. New instant communication technology has reinforced the discourse of 
the regime to act now: ‘…today the issue of a cultural invasion through the use of 	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new technologies is very serious.’120. The regime imagines a response as not rooted in 
traditional methods of counter-propaganda but utilising social media platforms: 
‘Today, we cannot rely on our old methods.’121.  
 Social media platforms were particularly vital in the aftermath of the purging 
of the physical manifestation of the Green Movement, the protest ‘moved 
underground to continue its activities—especially the output of visual materials via 
online forums and media platforms.’122. This move from physical to digital primacy 
of “seditionists” altered the discourse of the regime towards a digital orientation. 
Social media sites such as Facebook were subsequently attacked by Iran's police 
chief, Esmail Ahmadi-Moghaddam as the tools of "disaffected opponents, criminals 
and foreign [intelligence] services"123. In response to the enemy’s weaponisation of 
cyber space, the regime outlined that: ‘We too must develop an organized means to 
address the fight with the enemy in this arena.’124. And ‘all capacities and the latest 
technologies must be used in getting [our] message across in this arena [of soft 
war].’125. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This thesis aimed to look at how temporality and spatiality were structured in 
the discourse of soft war from a deconstructionist perspective. This study argued that 
an analysis of soft war discourse requires reference to the primary identities of Iran 
and their interaction with the contemporary political and social situation. Analysis of 
soft war discourse from 2009 – 2013 offers a broader understanding of how identity, 
time and space were used to structure discursive narratives, and how the 2009 protest 	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movement was interpreted by the regime.   
 The temporal aspect of soft war discourse reveals the disjunctive and 
contradictive structure in the soft war narrative. The most apparent forms of this 
disjuncture are the evocation of temporal immediacy, and the hauntological enemy. 
The temporality of immediacy sought to frame the threat of the enemy as existing in 
exceptional time and rooted in the contemporary. Whereas the hauntological 
imagining of the enemy was structured through the evocation of anti-imperialist 
discourse, placing the West in a historic role of an imperial power interfering in the 
internal affairs of Iran.  
 The institutionalisation of soft war marked a transformation of soft war from a 
purely discursive form into a material institution. Furthermore, this created path 
dependencies restricting the malleability of discourse and loosely tying it to a political 
framework. 
 The spatiality of soft war discourse similarly revealed a disjuncture in its 
discursive structure. The regime imagined the spatiality of the enemy as 
simultaneously a traditional binary threat and also as a new and exceptional threat. 
The discourse of the traditional threat outlined the historic enemy of the West as 
existing outside of Iran’s national borders. This form of spatial imagining was 
informed by imperialist, Islamist and nationalist identities. The spatial discourse of 
soft war as a new and exceptional threat dissolved the traditional boundaries of 
separation between Iran and the other, national boundaries and external actors. This 
discursive form was a response to the utilisation of new communication technologies 
used by protesters, connecting internal dissent with external critics and activists and 
seemingly locating the enemy internally and externally.   
 This study has shown that the discourse of soft war defines temporality and 
spatiality as disjunctive, and that identities are drawn upon in response to the 
contemporary political situation, but also within a historic genealogy of primary 
identities and a path dependency of subsequent institutionalisation.  
 The nexus between identity, narrative and space-time presents a potential area 
for further exploration and analysis. Deconstructionism offers the methodological 
tools to investigate this scholastic plateau and break the illusionary claims of 
empirical narration, and to question the structural antagonisms and contradictions 
within the production and reproduction of discourse and knowledge.  
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